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REMEDIES AND PROCEDURE: PATENT LAW’S CONTINUING 
FRONTIERS 
JOHN M. GOLDEN 
The relentless and commonly accelerating pace of technological devel-
opment has generated great boons for humanity.1 But the ever-changing 
landscape of possibilities, demands, and perils associated with such devel-
opment has also placed continual pressure on individuals and social institu-
tions to adapt.2 Modern times have presented us with the challenge of how 
to exploit, navigate, and, at least sometimes, escape the sea of data, data 
gathering, and data analytics that computing and communications technolo-
gies have enabled.3 
Unsurprisingly, patent law faces its own forms of information pro-
cessing problems and opportunities. Accelerated technological development 
appears generally to translate into greater numbers of patent applications and 
issued patents, thus generating more bases for claims of patent infringement.4 
The United States Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) struggles to maintain 
examination quality while keeping up—or at least not falling further be-
hind—in reviewing the hundreds of thousands of applications filed each 
year.5 Through the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB), the PTO also 
 
 Professor, The University of Texas School of Law. 
 1. See, e.g., Gene M. Grossman & Elhanan Helpman, Endogenous Innovation in the Theory of 
Growth, 8 J. ECON. PERSP. 23, 26 (1994) (“In our view, a story of growth that neglects technological 
progress is both ahistorical and implausible.”). 
 2. See, e.g., Clayton Christensen, Thomas Craig & Stuart Hart, The Great Disruption, 80 FOREIGN 
AFF. 80, 81 (2001) (“Disruptive technologies create major new growth in the industries they penetrate—
even when they cause traditionally entrenched firms to fail”). 
 3. See, e.g., Paul Ohm, Broken Promises of Privacy: Responding to the Surprising Failure of Anon-
ymization, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1701, 1705 (2010) (discussing how the rise of reidentification technologies 
with respect to supposedly anonymized data “makes all of our secrets fundamentally easier to discover 
and reveal”). 
 4. See, e.g., John M. Golden, Proliferating Patents and Patent Law’s “Cost Disease”, 51 HOUS. 
L. REV. 455, 465 (2013) (observing that “the basic trend of ever accelerating growth” in patenting “has 
been partly a product of the proliferation of technologies”).   
 5. See id. at 487 (“[E]ven the massive scaling up of the USPTO workforce in recent decades ap-
pears to have had relatively little success in addressing fundamental concerns about patent quality.”). 
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manages a busy docket of appeals from original examinations and reexami-
nations.6 The PTAB has a further substantial docket of trial proceedings—
called by names such as “inter partes review” and “post-grant review”—in 
which, generally speaking, panels of three administrative patent judges en-
tertain arguments about the validity of issued patent claims.7 Outside the 
PTO, the district courts need to process thousands of patent-infringement 
filings each year.8 The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 
must decide hundreds of appeals from patent-related decisions of the district 
courts, the PTO, and other administrative actors such as the International 
Trade Commission and the Court of Federal Claims.9 Outside the govern-
ment, private parties face challenges in identifying patents that might be in-
fringed, assessing the relative strength or weakness of arguments of patent 
claim infringement and invalidity, and assigning discrete values to individual 
patents and individual patented technologies, which often account for only a 
small part of the functionality of a multicomponent product or multistage 
process.10 
Both the requirements of international treaty regimes and the accumu-
lated weight of developed statutory provisions, case law, and legal traditions 
place substantial practical constraints on the extent to which the patent sys-
tem can respond to its information processing challenges with changes to 
patent law’s fundamental substantive contours, such as the nature of require-
ments for patentability.11 The United States Supreme Court appears to have 
caused an uptick in the stringency of patent law’s demand that an invention 
 
 6. John M. Golden, Working Without Chevron: The PTO as Prime Mover, 65 DUKE L.J. 1657, 
1667 (2016) (“The PTAB tends to resolve approximately ten thousand appeals each year in ex parte 
proceedings involving only the patent applicant or owner.”). 
 7. Id. (observing that, by the middle of 2014 through late 2015, the PTAB “already ha[d] a case 
flow of petitions for inter partes review equaling nearly one-third of the flow of new patent cases into all 
the U.S. district courts”); see also Stuart Minor Benjamin & Arti K. Rai, Administrative Power in the Era 
of Patent Stare Decisis, 65 DUKE L.J. 1563, 1569 (2016) (describing a typical PTAB post-issuance pro-
ceeding as involving “a three-judge panel”). 
 8. Lauren Cohen, John M. Golden, Umit G. Gurun & Scott Duke Kominers, “Troll” Check? A 
Proposal for Administrative Review of Patent Litigation, 97 B.U. L. REV. 1775, 1794 (2017) (observing 
that the rate of patent suit filings had risen to “over four thousand five hundred annually”). 
 9. See Greg Reilly, Decoupling Patent Law, 97 B.U. L. REV. 551, 583 (2017) (observing that the 
Federal Circuit “handles hundreds of patent appeals from each [of the patent-acquisition and patent-en-
forcement] context[s] each year”); see also Elizabeth Winston, Differentiating the Federal Circuit, 76 
MO. L. REV. 813, 816–17 & n.10 (2011) (discussing the jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit). 
 10. See Golden, supra note 4, at 476 (“The continual acceleration of patenting rates strains both 
public and private actors’ capacities to perform all the various activities necessary for a patent system to 
function effectively.”). 
 11. See, e.g., Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 606 (2010) (“Section 101 [of the Patent Act] similarly 
precludes the broad contention that the term ‘process’ categorically excludes business methods.”); Mar-
keta Trimble, Advancing National Intellectual Property Policies in a Transnational Context, 74 MD. L. 
REV. 203, 239 (2015) (“Notwithstanding the flexibilities [acknowledged], minimum standards provisions 
in international treaties do provide certain limits to national lawmaking.”).  
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be nonobvious in order to be patentable,12 but this uptick seems more in the 
nature of a marginal change than in the nature of a major watershed. This 
adjustment has apparently helped initial fact-finders dispose of doubtful pa-
tent claims,13 but the adjustment does not appear to have done much to stem 
the flood of applications into the system or to alleviate the sense of players 
in certain industries that they consistently confront tangled patent thickets.14 
The Court has made more dramatic interventions on questions of subject-
matter eligibility—i.e., the types of things, such as genetic sequences or com-
puter programs—that may be patented.15 But even here, the interventions 
have been substantially limited in scope: the Court has refused to say that 
either business methods or software is generally unpatentable.16 While the 
Court’s decisions relating to the patentability of genetic sequences and med-
ical diagnostic methods have been disruptive for substantial industry sectors, 
they have not quashed patenting in pharmaceuticals and biotechnology and 
appear to have left patenting in other fields of technology largely un-
touched.17 
Hence, although one can imagine changes to basic substantive doctrines 
of patentability and patent scope that could greatly alleviate or mitigate the 
patent system’s information demands, there seems relatively little possibility 
that such dramatic substantive change will occur in the near to mid-range 
future. The more wide open and inviting frontiers for important legal inno-
vations appear to lie in the realms of (1) remedies, an aspect of patent law 
that did not receive much attention until the last decade and a half;18 and 
(2) institutions and procedure, which, over the past few decades, have fea-
tured a series of huge developments, from the creation of a centralized court 
 
 12. See KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 419 (2007) (holding that the Federal Circuit 
had erred in applying “a rigid rule that [improperly] limit[ed] the obviousness inquiry”). 
 13. See, e.g., Jason Rantanen, The Federal Circuit’s New Obviousness Jurisprudence: An Empirical 
Study, 16 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 709, 762 (2013) (concluding that, in the wake of the Supreme Court’s 
intervention, the Federal Circuit showed “increased deference to the district courts’ findings of obvious-
ness”). 
 14. See Mark A. Lemley, The Surprising Resilience of the Patent System, 95 TEX. L. REV. 1, 2 
(2016) (“The patent system . . . seems surprisingly resilient to changes in the law.”). 
 15. See John M. Golden, Flook Says One Thing, Diehr Says Another: A Need for Housecleaning in 
the Law of Patentable Subject Matter, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1765, 1765 (2014) (“In a series of recent 
cases, the U.S. Supreme Court has made clear that there are substantial constraints on the categories of 
actions and materials for which patent protection may be afforded.”). 
 16. See Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2354 (2014) (declining to declaring 
software to be generally ineligible for patenting and stating instead that “an invention is not rendered 
ineligible for patent simply because it involves an abstract concept”); see also Bilski, 561 U.S. at 606 
(holding that there is no general prohibition of patenting business methods). 
 17. See Golden, supra note 4, at 1765–66 (discussing subject-matter eligibility decisions as having 
localized effects on “key kinds of modern innovation”). 
 18. John M. Golden, Principles for Patent Remedies, 88 TEX. L. REV. 505, 506 (2010) (“Once a 
joint domain of inertia and arcana, questions of patent remedies now generate heated public debate.”). 
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of appeals for patent cases in the form of the Federal Circuit,19 to the intro-
duction and progressive elaboration of post-issuance proceedings at the 
PTO,20 to the introduction of maintenance fees.21 Treaty commitments such 
as those under TRIPS appear to leave room for significant innovation in both 
of these realms, although how much is predictably a matter of debate.22 
Certain forms of institutional and procedural innovation could face a 
major and perhaps insuperable hurdle, however—institutional and proce-
dural constraints imposed by the United States Constitution, as that docu-
ment is understood by the nation’s Article III courts and, most particularly, 
the United States Supreme Court. Some constitutional constraints, such as 
requirements of due process, are, on their face or in practice, relatively flex-
ible and thus unlikely to present insuperable hurdles while channeling insti-
tutional and procedural innovation in a way that avoids constitutional prob-
lems, including practical problems of bias or unfairness that the patent 
system would do well to avoid.23 Others could more problematically present 
 
 19. See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, In Search of Institutional Identity: The Federal Circuit Comes 
of Age, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 787, 827 (2008) (discussing positive and negative aspects of the Federal 
Circuit’s patent jurisprudence). 
 20. See Eric C. Cohen, A Primer on Inter Partes Review, Covered Business Method Review, and 
Post-Grant Review Before the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, 24 FED. CIR. B.J. 1, 2–3 (2014) (noting 
how the introduction of ex parte reexamination in 1980 was followed by the introduction of inter partes 
reexamination in 1999 and the replacement of the latter with inter partes review, covered business method 
review, and post-grant review through the America Invents Act of 2011). 
 21. Saurabh Vishnubhakat, Expired Patents, 64 CATH. U. L. REV. 419, 430 n.79 (2015) (“All patents 
that issue from applications that were filed on or after December 12, 1980 are subject to three maintenance 
fees.”). 
 22. See, e.g., Amy Kapczynski, Harmonization and its Discontents: A Case Study of TRIPS Imple-
mentation in India’s Pharmaceutical Sector, 97 CAL. L. REV. 1571, 1608 n.223 (2009) (noting that 
“[s]ome commentators have concluded that [a particular TRIPS] provision permits countries broad dis-
cretion to limit injunctions”). But cf. Beatrice Lindstrom, Note, Scaling Back TRIPS-Plus: An Analysis of 
Intellectual Property Provisions in Trade Agreement and Implications for Asia and the Pacific, 42 N.Y.U. 
J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 917, 978–79 (2010) (concluding that “TRIPS-plus [bilateral trade agreements] exceed 
TRIPS in four main areas,” including by “mandat[ing] strengthened intellectual property enforcement 
procedures and penalties”). 
 23. Cf. JERRY L. MASHAW ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: THE AMERICAN PUBLIC LAW SYSTEM—
CASES AND MATERIALS 402 (7th ed. 2014) (“Given our peculiar governmental and constitutional history, 
procedural due process claims . . . provide many of the occasions for our on-going conversation concern-
ing the appropriate structure of an increasingly administrative state.”). For example, under at least some 
circumstances, due process constraints might condemn PTO rehearing practices under which the Director, 
after being disappointed by a decision on patentability or patent validity by a panel of administrative 
patent judges, convenes a new panel to rehear the case with the hope or knowledge that the new panel 
“will render the decision [the Director] desires,” In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1535 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (en 
banc). Golden, supra note 6, at 1663–64 & n.36; cf. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 135 (1926) 
(acknowledging that “there may be duties of a quasi-judicial character imposed on executive officers and 
members of executive tribunals whose decisions after hearing affect interests of individuals, the discharge 
of which the President cannot in a particular case properly influence or control”). But Congress might be 
able to amend the statute to permit the Director to review such a decision personally as long as such direct 
review comports with due process. See Laura S. Trice, Note, Adjudication by Fiat: The Need for Proce-
dural Safeguards in Attorney General Review of Board of Immigration Appeals Decisions, 85 N.Y.U. L. 
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relatively rigid and distinctively American barriers to institutional and pro-
cedural innovations that other countries’ patent systems might be free to de-
velop. 
Concern with civil “jury rights and the prerogatives of Article III 
courts” led me and three coauthors to restrict a proposed administrative re-
view process for newly launched patent litigation so that the administrative 
review was non-binding and merely advisory in relation to later proceedings 
in district courts.24 We argued that this proposed institutional reform would 
have substantial value despite this limitation.25 But one could wonder 
whether giving greater weight to the expert opinions thereby generated 
would lead to a further improved patent system even after the concerns that 
underlie the Constitution’s civil jury provision are taken into account. 
Likewise, constitutional challenge to inter partes review proceedings 
conducted by the PTAB on the grounds invoked by the petitioner in Oil 
States Energy Services, LLC v. Greene’s Energy Group, LLC26—namely, 
that these proceedings violate civil jury rights or Article III of the Constitu-
tion27—raises questions about the extent to which the United States will be 
relatively uniquely constrained in developing a patent system that processes 
applications and assertions of invalidity or infringement in ways that are so-
cially optimal. At least with respect to Article III concerns of the separation 
and balance of powers, the United States might be best served by an approach 
to constitutional interpretation and application that remains substantially 
pragmatic and views the Constitution as generally designed to help ensure 
that issues and problems are assigned to the branch of government most in-
stitutionally competent to handle them.28 
Although, as with the proposal for preliminary administrative review 
described above, one can often imagine ways to structure or restructure a 
procedural reform to overcome or avoid even the most rigid constitutional 
 
REV. 1766, 1770 (2010) (“Agency head or secretarial review of administrative adjudication is an accepted 
and relatively common arrangement within the administrative state.”). 
 24. Cohen, Golden, Gurun & Kominers, supra note 8, at 1828. 
 25. See id. at 1808–10 (outlining basic arguments for why such administrative review could be ef-
fective). 
 26. 137 S. Ct. 2239 (2017) (granting certiorari). 
 27. Brief for Petitioner at 3, Oil States Energy Servs., LLC v. Greene’s Energy Grp., LLC, 137 
S. Ct. 2239 (2017) (No. 16-712) (“Neither Article III nor the Seventh Amendment tolerates [inter partes 
review by the PTAB].”). 
 28. See Chadha v. Immigr. & Naturalization Serv., 634 F.2d 408, 423 (9th Cir. 1980) (Kennedy, J.). 
(describing “two respects in which the separation of powers enhances the responsible autonomy of each 
branch and thereby the efficiency of the government as a whole”), aff’d, 462 U.S. 919 (1983). 
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constraints, the game might not be worth the candle. The need for such insti-
tutional or procedural contortions might result in the reform failing to be 
adopted or failing to advance its purposes as desired even if adopted.  
In sum, the relatively relentless pressure placed on the current patent 
system by a generally growing rate of patent application and patent issuance 
appears currently to have two primary outlets for relief: (1) developments in 
the law on patent remedies and (2) institutional and procedural innovations. 
Presently, the PTAB lies at the center of this second path to meaningful re-
form. The United States Constitution limits some of the routes that such in-
stitutional or procedural reform might take. We can hope that such limits are 
commonly beneficial to the extent that they help ensure proper respect for 
parties and their associated legal rights. The Supreme Court’s opinion in Oil 
States might provide guidance on the extent to which such limits might be 
more substantial than Congress has previously understood, arguably to the 
point of being detrimental examples of how, from a policy perspective, pro-
hibitory rules can be over-inclusive in reach and excessively rigid in appli-
cation. But whatever the outcome of Oil States, questions of remedies and 
procedure appear likely to dominate much of the continuing frontiers of pa-
tent law development and adaptation. We can only hope that patent law’s 
adjusters and reformers are up to the task. 
 
